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Development of the European integration through the European Union (EU) considers not only 
strengthening integration from the economic aspect (internal market). It also considers the political aspect 
of the integration i.e. strengthening political integration of member states and their citizens. Political 
segment of integration considers strengthening of the internal policies of the EU in which fiscal system, i.e. 
public finances have extremely important role. The EU fiscal system presents reflection of the extremely 
strong and often confronted interests between the economic and the political integration. These issues are 
closely related to the second component of the European politic and economic integration, that are the 
fiscal relations between the EU “central” level and the national “lower” levels which bring the all important 
decisions in the EU. According to the theory of public finance (fiscal federalism) and the criteria of 
economic efficiency, fiscal functions (allocation, redistribution, stabilization) and activities are assigned to 
the different levels of government, as well as certain resources for their financing. On the basis of fiscal 
functions carried out by national levels in the EU, and the manner of their financing, the EU is a 
prominently fiscally decentralized complex community. The traditional approach to the fiscal federalism 
that fiscal authorities are transferred from central to lover levels means that this is a process of 
decentralization, while in the case of the EU this means centralization of fiscal authorities from the level on 
national states to the EU as a supra-national level. The main goal of this paper is to analyze fiscal relations 
in the EU according to basic fiscal functions: allocation, redistribution and stabilization. Methodology 
would include analysis and comparison of positive EU aspect with normative aspect of public finances in 
multi-level community. Induction of gained results will confirm thesis that, because of political restraints, 
development of common (central) system of the EU public finances is based on alternative approaches of 
harmonization and cooperation.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Creating and developing the EU fiscal system is not only an economic, but also an important political 
process. Generally, the fiscal system rests on the institutions and instruments necessary for the 
implementation of fiscal policy on a certain area. Creating institutional fiscal infrastructure at a supra-
national level of the EU is rather complex and limited due to globalization fiscal trends, but also due to 
political complexity of the integration of traditionally independent EU member countries.  
 
The main thesis of this paper is that the EU fiscal system does not develops according to the optimal theory 
of public finances and fiscal federalism, and different alternative methods are used in order to achieve basic 
functions of fiscal policy: allocation, redistribution and stabilization. In order to prove the thesis of this 
paper, the part following the introduction talks about the influence of politics on EU public finances. The 
third part gives a survey of the structure of the EU fiscal system, the fourth part talks about fiscal relations 
and fiscal functions in the EU and the fifth part is the conclusion. 
 
 
2.  THE IMPACT OF POLITICS ON PUBLIC FINANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The main goal of the European integration is creating common (single) market. The development of the 
common market lasted number of years; it had several development phases and is now based on the 27 
member countries, comparing to the initial six countries. The existing system of common market didn’t 
have only a basic economic dimension during its evolution, but also the political one which was often 
vague and extremely complex.  
 
Though the Rome Treaty from 1957 anticipated creating an European economic integration, the process of 
this integration can also be seen as a way to a stronger political integration. The conditions relevant for 
creating then an economic union did not refer to a political union and it is exactly this segment which today 
may be the biggest obstacle to a stronger and faster political EU integration. 
 
The system of public finances, i.e. fiscal system, was always on the border-line between the political and 
economic aspect of any country and/or integration. In the case of the EU, the fiscal system is a reflection 
for the level of demarcation between the market integration and a stronger political union. The EU fiscal 
system has an important role in the finale of EU market integration and enables a necessary cohesion for 
maintaining the existing level of EU economic and political integration. 
 
Apart from the above mentioned role of the fiscal system, a question about its other functions at the EU 
level and why it is relevant for a closer studying arises. First, studying the fiscal system is a good 
instrument for studying the EU political and economic potential, i.e. it can partially give an answer to the 
question “where is this integration going”. The answer to this question is maybe the most interesting in the 
overall context, especially when considering fiscal function of distribution and redistribution which should 
be created in conditions of harmful tax competition and continuing disagreements on the redistribution of 
the EU budget funds. Second, but no less important, the fiscal system historically always had an important 
role in the development of modern states and public society in general, regardless of its predominantly 
economic component (Šimović, J.& H., 2006: 4). 
 
Because of all these open issues, it is very difficult to define the form and level of the political order and the 
EU constitutional form from the economic point of view. One thing is definite and that is the fact that the 
EU has made a step forward in this segment to a semi-developed regional community with some 
characteristics of an independent state as such (Laffan, 1998: 18-20). 
 
Precisely due to political and constitutional limitations which today refer to confederations such as the EU, 
the EU fiscal system is relatively small and undeveloped compared to the fiscal systems of typical national 
countries. During the creation of the fiscal system and fiscal relations in the EU, the traditional theory of 
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such fiscal relations with which: 1) the EU member countries could keep a high degree of political and 
constitutional independence, 2) the supra-national or confederal level of government could have only the 
authorities the member countries gave them, 3) the fiscal rules set at a confederal level wouldn’t be in 
conflict with the ones at the national level and 4) the monetary union should function within the 
confederation (Mihaljek, 1998:208). In such situation, the possibility for stronger centralization of the basic 
fiscal functions
1 was weak, especially in the earlier phases of integration. 
 
When studying the EU fiscal system, several things should be kept in mind. First, there is a significant 
difference in the form and role of public finances, i.e. the EU fiscal system in relation to some national EU 
member countries. Second, public finances and public sector in all developed Western economies form a 
significant part in the GDP, regardless the historical deviation of the neo-liberal conception of the state in 
supporting the economic growth and development. Having these facts in mind, it is necessary to study the 
future development of the European integration and its fiscal system. The last and maybe the most 
important point is that the EU fiscal system can’t be completely studied and created congruent to the 
optimal theory of public finances. The main “public” instrument which is at EU’s disposal when 
implementing its policies is regulation, instead of common politics and/or positive integration. Such frame 
of political intervention limits the development of standard public finances system and includes the theory 
of public choice in analyzing and creating the EU fiscal system.  
 
 
3.  FISCAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The structure of the EU fiscal system comes down to the EU budget as the only instrument for 
implementing the fiscal policy from the central supra-national EU level. The rest of the fiscal system can be 
seen as a set of different rules and arrangements through which the member countries harmonize and 
coordinate other segments of fiscal policy. This primary refers to harmonization of taxation and 
coordination of stabilization fiscal (budget) policies through Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and 
Maastricht convergence criteria. 
 
The EU budget is relatively small and through it a limited amount of funds is allocated compared to the 
area it covers (27 EU member countries). According to the size and structure of revenues and expenditures 
it differentiates from the standard budgets of national countries. The total revenues and total expenditures 
of the EU budget is little over 1% of the EU‘s GDP. The EU budget has its own funds resources but these 
resources come from tax revenues of the national budgets of the member countries and are controlled by 
their governments. The basic function of this budget is to finance common functions and EU policies where 
the most prominent expenditures are agriculture and the structural policies. 
 
Harmonization of the tax system can be studied as the second segment of the EU fiscal system. Levying tax 
is exclusively in the domain of the EU member states and tax regulations are part of the national tax system 
of a certain member country. Still, since the EU membership is based on an international agreement which 
includes certain rights and commitments for the member countries, their tax independence is limited, i.e. 
divided between the EU and the member countries. In order to strengthen the common internal market, the 
EU has used different guidelines and other legal regulations to influence the development of the legal 
systems of the EU member countries and in this way EU used the fiscal harmonization as an alternative 
approach to fiscal federalism.  
 
The third segment of the EU fiscal system is seen in the coordination of stabilization of budget policies of 
the member countries through EU’s fiscal rules. Fiscal rules apply, before anything, to SGP but also to 
Maastricht convergence criteria. The surrounding that influenced the development of the current EU fiscal 
system also influenced the coordination of budget policies of the EU member countries. In this context, a 
need for maintaining fiscal discipline inside the monetary union is especially emphasized. The main aim of 
the SGP is preventing the occurrence of excessive budget deficits, in order to maintain the fiscal discipline, 
wise public finances management and preserving the economic stability inside the Economic and Monetary 
                                                                          
1 Allocation, redistribution and stabilization function (Musgrave, 1959). FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-04 
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union (EMU). The way in which the SGP is implemented is based on a multilateral supervision of the 




4.  FISCAL RELATIONS AND FISCAL FUNCTIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The existing structure of the fiscal system formulates the implementation of fiscal policy. Studying 
Musgrave’s (1959) public finance functions in the EU context one can find many deviations from what the 
theory of public finances or theory of fiscal federalism suggests. It is necessary to emphasize once again 
that the deviations from the theory of public finances should be taken conditionally since creating the EU’s 
fiscal system is happening in conditions of an confederation with many undefined present and future 
institutional directions of development. According to the theoretical principles of allocation of fiscal 
functions to different levels of government, the rest of the paper will analyze the role of EU and its member 






The theorem of decentralization dominates the funds allocation segment in the theory of fiscal federalism, 
i.e. the opinion that the local public goods should be offered locally and common public goods at a central 
level. If this wouldn’t happen, there would be a fall of prosperity at a local level (Oates, 1972) and there 
would be a possibility that the local population should express its preferences by migration (voting by feet) 
to the area which best meets their preferences (Tiebout, 1956). 
 
In the EU context common or “supra-national” public goods should be realized at the EU level, according 
to the theorem of decentralization. Defence and foreign policy are a typical example of such public goods 
and services. The theorem of decentralization is in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which 
claims that the activities of the central government are not necessary if the activities of member countries 
(local communities) don’t lead to inter-state extern effects (spillovers). According to this, the intervention 
at the EU level is necessary only in the case of inter-border extern effects (Cullis & Jones, 1998:303). 
 
Though defence and foreign policy are typical examples of supra-national public goods, there is a 
significant disinclination of the member countries to transferring these functions to the EU. There are 
several reasons which could justify such situation. First and most often mentioned is the fear that the 
common policy of defence and foreign policy could be contradictory to the aims of several member 
countries. The other reason is the lack of coordination between member countries. In other words, if all the 
member countries should agree on certain issues, maybe the common policy couldn’t be introduced due to 
the problem of the “free ride”. This could mean that certain countries wouldn’t like to express their real 
preferences for e.g. certain foreign policy issues. Indecisiveness of the EU to react to the war and 
aggression in former Yugoslavia on time is often mentioned as a confirmation of this obstacle (Persson et 
al., 1996:4). 
 
There are areas of policies where the central EU institutions have great power for making decisions, which 
is in accordance with the theorem of decentralisation and the principle of subsidiarity. These are mainly 
policies formulated by the Rome Treaty. These are policies which affect the competitiveness of economies 
and the biggest such joint policy refers to agriculture. The common agricultural policy is financed from the 
EU budget.  
 
The EU budget, being the only real segment of the “common” fiscal system in the EU, is relatively small 
and through it a limited amount of funds is allocated comparing to the area it covers (27 member countries). 
In 2005 the budget’s total revenues and total expenditures were around 1% of the EU-25 GDP (European 
                                                                          
2 On each of these segments of the EU fiscal system see Šimović, J. & Šimović, H. (2006). 
3 On the efficacy of allocation of fiscal functions to different levels of government in the EU (normative and positive aspect) see: 
Breuss & Eller (2003) and Garmlich & Wood (2000). FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-04 
  Page 7 of 11
Commission, 2006). Comparing it to the USA whose total revenues make around 17,7 % of the GDP, while 
this number in the European national budgets varies from 35-50% (f.e. Germany 36, 2%, Sweden 50, 6%) 
(OECD, 2003). The similar happens with the budget’s total expenditures of the national countries. For 
example, in the USA the budget expenditures are around 18% while this number in the European countries 
varies from 30-45% (e.g. Germany 32, 5%, Sweden 38, 8%) (IMF, 2004). If the central EU government 
should take responsibility for the standard policies and public services which the theory suggests (defence, 
foreign policy, etc.) than the EU budget should be increased both from the revenue and the expenditure’ 
side. 
 
Though relatively small, the EU budget is not irrelevant. The revenue and the expenditure side differentiate 
from the “classical” national budgets. The EU budget has its own fund resources, but these resources come 
from tax revenues of member states budgets and are controlled by their governments. The EU budget 
doesn’t have standard tax revenues; it actually doesn’t have a common tax which would enable a stronger 
control, higher degree of responsibility and a possibility of financing larger offer (allocation) of public 
goods and services.  
 
As previously mentioned, the basic public goods and services which are financed trough national budgets 
are education, defence, foreign policy, health services, etc while the EU budget has two significant 
expenditures: the agriculture (in the subsection Preservation and Management of Natural Resources) and 
expenditures for a Sustainable Growth (structural funds). Their functional significance is bigger than the 
budget itself. The EU budget in the year 2005 was 115,9 billion EUR and these two subsections make 
around 80 % of all EU budget expenses (European Commission, 2006). 
 
When concerning transferring certain functions to higher levels of government in the EU, the approach of 
fiscal federalism is different from the approach of the theory of public choice. The representatives of the 
school of public choice are more than restrained when transferring responsibility for allocating resources to 
a higher level of government because they think that the problem of a possible failure of the central level 
will be bigger than if it happened on a local level. There are several explanations why the centralization of 
certain functions still exists. One of the explanations is that the voters “rationally ignore” these problems 
due to insufficient amount of information. The problems with accessibility and the quality of information 
get bigger with the fact that the system has more levels of government. There are opinions that the EU is 
interesting to the politicians from the member countries because it increases the expenses of collecting 
information and distorts the real situation with  the expenses for the implemented policies which are 





With redistribution function, the theory of fiscal federalism advocates its implementation at the central 
level. The main reason of implementing redistribution function at the central level is the problem of 
mobility of production factor caused by the harmful tax competition, and including a wider tax base by 
taxing at the central level. In this way the theory gave principles which should be applied when giving roles 
to certain taxes at different levels of government and also negative effects which could appear in case of 
non-implementation of redistribution function at the central level
4. The fiscal federalism studies the 
redistribution at the local level as a local public good. As long as the redistribution is done efficiently at a 
lower level of government, it should not be moved to the central level.  
 
The basic question in the context of the EU is how important is the issue of mobility in distribution of fiscal 
functions within the EU and how much it effects the budget expenditures of the member states? If the 
                                                                          
4 Musgrave (1983) set several criteria according to which certain taxes could be collected at the local level. First, the taxes suitable 
for economical stabilization should be collected at the central (national) level while the taxes which are collected at the local level 
should be neutral to cyclical trends. Second, progressive taxes for redistribution purposes, as a income tax, should be collected at 
the central level. Third, other progressive taxes should be collected at the level which best includes its tax. Fourth, lower levels of 
government should tax the bases whose mobility is low. The last, the taxes whose base is extremely unevenly divided all over the 
state should be collected at the central government.    FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-04 
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mobility of the people (population) is studied than an aggressive redistribution policy in a certain country 
could attract people with a lower income and affect the emigration of people with higher income. Such 
situations happened in the USA. But, the conditions which influence the mobility of people in the EU, apart 
from the taxation, are different then in the US. This primarily refers to lack of a common European 
citizenship, then the existence of language barrier but also the differences in culture, religion and other 
segments of life which are more prominent in the EU than in the USA. For some authors it is only a matter 
of time when these barriers will be removed and therefore they suggest that the redistribution policy in the 
segment of income taxation should be implemented at the central level in the EU. (Inman & Rubinfeld, 
1991). 
 
Due to many, still existing, major language and cultural barriers the population mobility doesn’t represent a 
threat which should demand centralization of redistribution policy at the moment. Still, the mentioned 
arguments don’t influence capital mobility and highly qualified workforce. Different capital tax treatments, 
tax relieves, incentive and an increasing demand for the highly qualified workforce influence the mobility 
of these factors of production and are causing harmful tax competition. Redistribution policy on the level of 
member countries can hardly stop the capital mobility and mobility of highly qualified workforce. Such 
redistribution policy is, however, not efficient. Mobility and efficiency influence the suggestions that the 
redistribution policy should transfer to the EU level with a more significant share.  
 
One of the reasons which could affect strengthening of the central redistribution policy within the EU is the 
role of insurance which is seen through different financial aids (transfers). Such help already partially exists 
in the EU and is realized through the EU budget. Redistribution funds of the EU budget are realized 
through structural funds of the EU and their basic function is to give financial aid to less developed regions 
so they could achieve economic and social cohesion in the EU. Each of these funds has precise goals to 
achieve in certain areas such as infrastructure, human factor, agriculture, fisheries, etc. That the 
redistribution role of the EU budget is limited is obvious from the rule which says that each EU member 
can collect up to 4% of its GDP of the transfers from the structural funds. This limitation of the 
redistribution effects of the EU budget is a result of both political and fiscal power which is still in the 
competence of the member countries themselves.  
 
The traditional fiscal theory explains the reason why the redistribution function exists with altruistic 
motives – the unselfish will of the individuals to separate a part of their income for redistribution purpose. 
In contrast to this the theory of public choice explains different transfers, subsidies and tax benefits on 
which the redistribution is based as an consequence of better level of organization, lobbying of different 
interest  groups and the complexity of the public sector structure. In the context of the EU budget and the 
EU redistribution policy, the latter is more suitable due to the complexity of the vertical structure and 
political decision making in “the EU public sector”. The EU budget is not relatively big nor is it oriented 
primarily to achieving the function of “prosperity”, therefore its normative redistribution role in its very 
beginning is limited. 
 
In the segment of tax policy, redistribution policy on the EU level was substituted with an alternative 
approach – with fiscal harmonization. The aims of fiscal harmonization are the same as of fiscal federalism. 
Due to many differences between the EU members, harmonization of taxation especially served as a real 
solution to achieve common goals of the EU member countries, i.e. achieving so called four great freedoms 
why the EU was formed in the first place and these are: the free movement of goods, services, people and 
capital.  
 
Apart from strengthening common EU market, harmonization of taxation happened exactly because every 
country in this world is reluctant to give up its fiscal sovereignty, especially in the area of taxation. The 
harmonization process as a minimum degree of unity in the segment of tax policy gave satisfying results 
only in the sphere of consumption taxation by introducing value added tax (VAT). Goals for the tax policy 
in the EU, such as stabilization of tax incomes of the member countries and the growth of employment in 
the EU, demanded harmonization of other tax forms, especially the company (profit) and personal income 
tax. Except with consumption taxation (VAT), more significant deviations happen in capital and labour FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-04 
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taxation among the EU members. Labour taxation (personal income tax) due to reduced workforce mobility 
in the EU is not such an urgent area for implementing stronger harmonization. But, taxation of companies 
and the capital are areas where the harmful tax competition is happening which is causing many negative 
(external) effects as the “escape” of the capital into tax acceptable countries. The appearance of harmful tax 
competition is a consequence of the tax base mobility. The theory of fiscal federalism advocates 
harmonization of the taxes whose bases are mobile while with immobile tax bases this is not necessary (e.g. 
immobile properties). For this reason, the EU has devoted more attention to these areas of taxation over the 
last years and therefore many guidelines and other legal acts are in a process of  adoption (e.g. Code of 
Conduct for Business Taxation) in order to prevent harmful tax competition and a more efficient 





While with allocation and redistribution function of public finance it is possible in some cases that the 
theory suggests their implementation at lower lever of government (subsidiarity principle), with 
stabilization function this is not the case. Primarily because of economic efficiency and internalization of 
external effects its implementation is recommended to only at the central level.  
 
In the EU context, the most important deviation from the theory of fiscal federalism is in the fact that the 
stabilization fiscal policy is almost completely implemented from the lower levels of government, i.e. from 
the EU member countries. There are several reasons why this is so. First, the EU budget is relatively small 
to create any significant stabilization effects in the EU. Second, no other centralised fiscal instrument 
exists, e.g. social security which would automatically act in a stable way. Third, the EU members which are 
also EMU members have a common monetary policy whose primary aim is to maintain the price stability. 
But the monetary policy measures can’t have the same effect on all the EU members, which means that 
there is a possibility they could act pro-cyclic. Due to proved frequency of differential shocks in the EU and 
the lack of and/or languid of other stabilization instruments of economic policy (f.e. workforce mobility, 
relative price, etc.), decentralized fiscal policies of the EU member countries, and especially EMU, are the 
most efficient instrument of stabilization policy in the EU (Šimović J.& H., 2006). 
 
The theory of fiscal federalism suggests balanced local budgets and controlled central government 
borrowing. One of the basic deviations in relation to the theory is that of the EU member countries budgets 
are not balanced. Many authors defend the theoretical claims very firmly and advocate balanced budgets of 
lower government levels which then prevent the uncontrolled growth of the central budget’s deficit. On the 
other hand, the central government can advocate the rule of a balanced budget at a local level but this also 
doesn’t have to be valid at the central level (Alesina & Perotti, 1996). 
 
The control of borrowing exists and is implemented through Maastricht criteria and especially SGP are 
only a framework within which member countries can independently conduct their fiscal policy. Some 
constitutional prohibitions and conducting a differential fiscal policy, like in the USA, doesn’t exist. 
Limitations of borrowing, primarily by the through the SGP, were imposed primarily because of 
maintaining credibility and of fear that uncontrolled deficits and public debt could compromise an efficient 
conducting of monetary policy at the EU level, or EMU level. 
 
If we go by the subsidiarity principle, which claims that a certain responsibility for a certain policy should 
be awarded to the level of government which can most efficiently execute it, than there are several reasons 
why fiscal function of stabilization should be implemented at the level of the EU member states. In order to 
partially transfer the function of stabilization to the EU level, it is necessary to build some other instruments 
such as a much larger EU budget with more functions from the ones it carries out today. The other reason 
could be found in the lack of automatic stabilizers, f.e. unemployment insurance, at the EU level. 
 
In the context of fiscal federalism and the subsidiarity principle it seems very important not only at which 
level the fiscal policy is carried out today, but also who makes the decisions on this issue and with which FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-04 
  Page 10 of 11
instruments it is carried out. When taking into consideration all the claims mentioned, the fiscal function of 
stabilization will be the most difficult one to transfer to the EU level. Nevertheless, the past practice proved 
this, because the segments of redistribution and allocation policy in the fiscal sphere at the EU level are 
relatively more advanced then the stabilization ones. When observing efficiency, it is for now unnecessary 
in the present fiscal federalism in the EU to transfer fiscal function to a higher level. 
 
Due to everything so far mentioned the concept of conducting stabilization fiscal policy is different in the 
EU then for each of the EU countries. The EU fiscal position is defined by a number of fiscal positions of 
the member countries. On the other side, the EU fiscal position is partially regulated by the Maastricht 
criteria and SGP. Such given restrictions are a specific quality of stabilization fiscal policy in the EU and 
provoke criticism. Though many objections to these limitations have its foundations, the empirical data 
point to the past success of conducting such stabilization policy. However, in the case of stronger recession 
shocks, the given EU fiscal position and restrictions formulated by the SGP could have major negative 
consequences. Since the present institutional restrictions are hardly to be abolished, the policies of the 
member countries should be based on hiving up deficit and public debt in case of stronger recession shocks. 
Due to possible negative consequences, many experts advocate a reform of the existing way of conducting 
stabilization fiscal policy in the EU. One of the possible directions is deviation from the given limitations, 
for which a reform of fiscal institutions of member countries, such as Social Security is necessary 
(Eichengreen, 2003). Such policy would lead to further (de)centralization but also to disruption of the 
European economic integration, which makes it even less probable. The other option is advocated by a 
group of authors (e.g. Masson (1996), Barry (2001)) and it suggests higher centralization of fiscal powers 
in the EU and a progress in direction of formulating such fiscal policy which would act most efficiently on 
the stabilization of cyclic trends and wouldn’t disrupt the achieved degree of economic integration in the 
EU. This scenario before anything includes strengthening of the role of fiscal rules in the EU through which 
with a stronger coordination and control of certain budget policies stabilization policy would “centralize” as 
an alternative to fiscal federalism. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The theory of public finance gave a more definite shape the “rules of the game” which could lead to 
optimum level of decision making on intergovernmental fiscal relations. However, theoretical rules were 
modified in many of its contents in the context of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the EU. The fact that 
there are efforts to transfer fiscal authorities from a central to a lower level of government in the conditions 
of fiscal federalism is a sign that this is a decentralization process, while in the case of the EU, like this 
paper has shown, there are efforts to centralize fiscal authorities from the level of national countries to the 
EU as a supra-national level.  
 
The issue of fiscal federalism in the EU is very actual and its own way specific. The EU is an interstate 
community still searching its identity. Adopting the EU Constitution is only one of the elements which are 
necessary to build and which already turned out to be a problem. The EU has to go into direction of a 
stronger political and economic integration if it wants take over the leading role in the world politics and 
economy. Strengthening fiscal integration is also one of many important assumptions for a stronger 
European integration. Fiscal federalism is a good approach through which an efficient system of decisions-
making at the central EU level and at the level of each member country can be built. Creation of one such 
system calls for many modified solutions and alternative approaches to the theory which can be seen 
through harmonization and coordination of fiscal policies. Still, all the solutions have to be found within 
the framework which is offered by the theory of public finances, all with an aim of creating a more efficient 
and righteous fiscal system for all the EU members. 
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